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Abstract
Strikes are totally ine¢cient from an economic point of view. They
occur when the two parties that bargain over a contract do not …nd
an agreement and the result is a loss of utility for both. In spite
of their clear ine¢ciency in the real world strikes are very common
both in the rich economies as well as in the poor countries. Moreover
recent empirical literature found some regularities over time and over
countries regarding the strike behavior of the Trade Unions. The aim
of this paper is to develop a theory that could explain this apparent
economic paradox as well as some of the most known regularities. At
the same time we also aim to link the analysis of the strikes with the
investment decisions of employers and workers in that particular kind
of capital good known as Human Capital. This kind of approach can
put under a new light the role played by the Trade Unions in the
process of economic growth.
1 Introduction
Strikes are apparently not Pareto optimal because it means that the pie that
has to be divided between employers and workers is reduced. Thus if the
parties are rational it is di¢cult to provide an explanation regarding why
they fail to negotiate a Pareto optimal outcome1. This paradox, de…ned by
Kennan (1986) the “Hicks’ paradox”, represents probably the reason why
1For a more detailed discussion of bargaining processes and Pareto optimality see
Harsany (1977) and Myerson (1984).
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there is still no commonly accepted economic theory of strikes. Hicks (1963)
proposed two lines of research to solve this dilemma: either the union is
trying to maintain some form of “reputation for toughness”, or there is
private information on at least one side of the bargaining table.
This paper develops a model of repeated bargaining between employers
and workers in which the employers have private information on the condi-
tions of the market2. Basically we use the same methodology used by Green
and Porter (1984) to model the occurrence of wars of prices in an oligopolist
market. The idea is that when the …rms …re workers these are not able to
distinguish if this decision is due to a negative shock on the Demand or to
an attempt of employers of taking a bigger share of the “pie”. Under these
conditions in equilibrium the workers strike whenever they observe a reduc-
tion in the size of the “pie” that they receive and the employers act always
fairly, so the strike occurs just when the economy is a¤ected by a negative
shock. But, since the workers know that employers will redistribute less just
as a consequence of a negative shock, why do they not disregard the strike
and continue to work? The answer is that everyone understands the incen-
tive properties of the equilibrium. If workers did not strike in response to
the reduced share then …rms would have a strong incentive to redistribute a
little amount to the workers even under good condition of the market.
It is important to underline that some comparative static exercises oper-
ated on the model replicate very well some qualitative features of the strikes
found out by the empirical literature. Tracy (1984) found out countercycli-
cal ‡uctuations of strikes in duration; in turns he claims that an economic
recession leads to longer strikes and this feature is perfectly reproduced by
our model: an increase in the parameter that represents the probability of
occurrence of a negative shocks leads to longer periods of strike chosen by
the workers3. Moreover, Kennan (1980) states that another determinant of
the increase in strikes duration is an environment which reduces the losses
induced by strikes; again, a reduction in the parameter that we choose to de-
scribe the cost of strikes leads to an increase in their duration in equilibrium.
2Fundemberg, Levine and Ruud (1983) and Hayes (1984) have shown that the theory
of exchange with private information can provide a theoretically complete model of strike.
The basic point of this literature is that although strikes are not Pareto optimal ex-post
they may be Pareto optimal ex-ante, in the sense that every alternative leave either the
union or the employer worse o¤ in some contingency which cannot be ruled out on the
basis of the information which is common to both sides.
3For an analysis of the cyclicity of the strikes see also Ashfelter and Jhonson (1969).
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In the second part of this paper we introduce another dimension of choice
for the parties: investment in human capital. Recent research emphasized
the fundamental role of human capital in economic growth (see, e.g. Lucas
(1988) and Mankiw,Romer and Weil (1992) among the others), and the rea-
son because of which people do invest in this particular kind of capital good
is still an open question. We imagine that both parties can invest in human
capital during the cooperation periods (i.e. the periods without strikes) and
that the quantity of human capital accumulated by each party will a¤ect
the new contract that they sign after the next strike. This mechanism is
meant to model the fact that usually more skilled worker are able to obtain
richer contracts. To model this particular dynamic optimization problem un-
der uncertainty we use the technics developed by Calvo (1984) and applied
in monetary economics models. We …nd that in equilibrium the quantity
of human capital accumulated by each party is directly related with the ef-
fectiveness of the human capital (i.e. the way in which the level of human
capital a¤ects the new terms of the contract) and with the expected value
of the total revenue; in turns, our model states that richer countries will be
characterized by higher level of human capital, a result that is in line with
the empirical …ndings of the recent literature.
Finally, in the last section we propose a possible extension of the model.
In particular we think that using the basic structure of this paper is possible
to build up a growth model in which the engine of growth is the human
capital accumulation and that generates growth cycles in correspondence of
each strike period.
2 Cyclical Strikes and Demand Shocks
2.1 The model
The framework is that of a basic supergame. There are two parties Workers
(from now onW ) and Capitalists (from now on C) that divide between them
the total revenues realized in each period. One can think to the Workers
party as a Trade Union and to the Capitalists party as an organization of
the owners of the …rms. In each period there are two possible states of
nature which a¤ect the total revenue. With probability ® a negative shock
on demand is realized and with probability 1¡® the demand is high; so that
the total revenue in the good state is strictly larger than under the bad one:
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TRH > TRN . For the moment let us imagine that there is a division rule
which is considered as fair in the society: this rule is ¼F = 1=2 ¤TR for each
party. Now, since in low demand state the total revenue is lower then the
same fair sharing rule leads to ¼ = 1=2 ¤ TRN < 1=2 ¤ TRH = ¼f .
Moreover in each period each party can undertake two possible actions.
The W can “work” or go to “strike”. We assume that in a period of strike
Capitalists can run the …rm at a “reduced” production level4 while Workers
can take part to di¤erent productive activities (like partial-time jobs,...); let’s
say that this “outside option” level for both parties is the same and equal to
X (with ¼f > X > 0).The C can adopt the “fair” division rule or can take
for them a bigger amount of the TR (let’s say that if they take this second
choice during an high demand period the workers are left with exactly a
portion ¼). Let me assume that the realizations of demand are i:i:d: over
time and, for simplicity, that ¼ = X .
The timing of the model is the following. First, the nature “chooses” the
state: bad or good. Second, the Capitalists, once they observed the actually
veri…ed state, propose to the Workers a remuneration: ¼ or ¼f . Finally the
Workers move without knowing the state of nature: they can either accept
the proposal and cooperate or refuse it and go to strike (in this case they get
a payo¤ of X).
The point is that the W when receive ¼ < ¼f at some date are not able
to observe whether the reduction of their total wages is due to the realization
to the shock or to an attempt of C of appropriating a larger share of total
revenue.
We consider an in…nitely repeated version of this game and we look at a
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium with the following strategies:
-Workers’ Strategy: they act alternating “working phases” to “strike
phases”. The W start acting fairly, that is they do not strike until they
receive a payo¤ of ¼. The occurrence of ¼ triggers a “strike phase”: they
strike for exactly T periods (where T can be …nite or in…nite) getting a payo¤
of X and obliging also the C to receive such a payo¤ (remember that when
they strike the production is reduced). At the end of this phase they restart
to work as long as they receive ¼f ;
-Capitalists’ Strategy: they start applying the fair division rule and they
redistribute ¼ to the W just when the negative shock is realized. But the
4This assumption is particularly e¤ective for …rms with an high capital-labor share:
see Tracy (1984) for a discussion.
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occurrence of a “strike phase” generate an hostile mood of C so that they
apply the unfair division rule for all the phase, i.e. T periods
Let us now check if these strategies constitute an equilibrium, i.e. if along
the equilibrium path they are optimal from the point of view of each party.
Then we will …nd the value of T that support such an equilibrium.
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We start checking for the optimality of the Workers strategy we characterize
in the previous section. The strategy is always optimal along the “strike
phase”. Given that C impose ¼ = X no matter what during T periods, the
W cannot improve from the strike position.
Let now V + (respectively V ¡) denote the present discounted value of
workers’ earnings from date t on, assuming that at date t the game is in a
“working phase” (respectively that starts the “strike phase”). By stationarity
V + and V ¡ do not depend on the time. By de…nition we have:
V + = (1 ¡ ®)(¼f + ±V +) + ®(±V ¡ +X) (1)
V ¡ = ±TV + +
T¡1X
s=0
±sX (2)
Equation (1) says that in a “working phase” Workers do not go to strike
and Capitalists apply the “fair rule”. With probability 1¡® Demand is high,
Workers (as well as Capitalists) receive ¼f and the game remains in such a
phase. With probability ® there is low demand today and the game will be
in a “strike phase” tomorrow. Equation (2) yields the present discounted
value of earnings at the begin of the “strike phase” (note now that this value
functions are exactly the same also for the capitalists).
Since ¼f > X by assumption it is possible to show that (see Appendix I):
V + > V ¡
SoWdo not want to go to strike during the “working phase” and we have
proved that the Workers’ strategy is optimal in each one of the game phases.
Now we have to analyze the behavior of the Capitalists. The strategy is
clearly optimal in the “strike phase”: given that W go to strike no matter
what during the T periods, the C cannot improve the X payo¤ that they get
running the …rm at a reduced speed.
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Now we have to add an “Incentive Constraint” (IC) which state that the
Capitalists do not have any advantages undercutting the “working phase”
through the application of the “unfair” division rule in an high demand
period. That is,
¼f + ±V + > TRH ¡ ¼ + ±V ¡
we can rewrite this constraint as follows
V + > (1 ¡ ®)(TRH ¡ ¼ + ±V ¡) + ®(±V ¡ +X)
and since we have assumed that 1=2 ¤ TRH = ¼f and ¼ = X we can
express the IC as follows,
V + > (1 ¡ ®)(2¼f ¡ X + ±V ¡) + ®(±V ¡ +X) (3)
This equation expresses the trade o¤ that capitalists face. If the apply
the “unfair” sharing rule, they get 2¼f ¡ X > ¼f . However applying such
a rule automatically triggers the “strike phase”, which yields valuation V ¡
instead of V +. Thus to deter the application of the unfair rule V ¡ should be
su¢ciently lower than V +. This means that the strike must last long enough.
When this constraint is satis…ed also the Capitalists’ strategy is optimal.
2.3 Equilibrium length of strikes
So far we have shown that the pair of strategies we were interested in repre-
sents a Nash equilibrium for our game if and only if the length of the strike
periods is big enough. But does this value of T which supports an equilibrium
always exists?
Note that because strikes are costly and occur with positive probability,
T should be chosen (by the Trade Unions) as small as possible given that
equation (3) must be satis…ed.
Now, plugging (1) in (3) we …nd:
(1¡ ®)(¼f + ±V +) +®(±V ¡ +X) > (1¡ ®)(2¼f ¡X + ±V ¡) + ®(±V ¡ +X)
And, after some algebra we get:
±(V + ¡ V ¡) > ¼f ¡X (4)
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on the other hand, plugging (2) in (1) I get:
V + = (1¡ ®)(¼f + ±V +) + ®(±T+1V + + ±
T¡1X
s=0
±sX +X)
Now let’s de…ne,
T¡1X
s=0
±sX ´ X
So that:
V + = (1 ¡ ®)(¼f + ±V +) + ®(±T+1V + + ±X +X)
Therefore,
V + =
(1¡ ®)¼f + ®(±X +X)
1¡ (1 ¡ ®)± ¡ ®±T+1 (5)
Working now with equations (5), (2) and (4) it is possible to express the
“Incentive Constraint” as follows:
±
µ
(1¡ ®)(1¡ ±T )¼f + ®(±X +X)(1¡ ±T )
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)± ¡ ®±T+1 ¡X
¶
¸ ¼f ¡ X
Thus the problem that we have to solve to …nd the optimal T (that is the
problem that the Trade Union face when it has to decide the length of the
strike) is the following,
Max
T2[0;+1[
V + =
(1¡ ®)¼f + ®(±X(T ) +X)
1¡ ± + ®± ¡ ®±T+1
over the set of T such that:
±
µ
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ±T )¼f + ®(±X(T ) +X)(1 ¡ ±T )
1 ¡ ± + ®± ¡ ®±T+1 ¡X
¶
¸ ¼f ¡X
where,
X(T ) =
T¡1X
s=0
±sX = X ¢ 1 ¡ ±
T
1¡ ±
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so,
X(T ) = X(1 ¡ ±T )(1¡ ±)¡1
Solving this problem is quite di¢cult but for our ends it will be enough
to show that the value function V + is strictly decreasing in T while the
constraint is strictly increasing so that the optimal T is exactly the more
little value of this variable that satis…es the constraint..
Now, let us de…ne,
1¡ ± = " (8)
d(T ) = 1 ¡ ±T
So that
X(T ) = "¡1Xd(T )
And note that the function d(T ) is strictly increasing, infect:
d
dT
d(T ) = ¡ loge ± ¢ ±T > 0 (6)
Moreover, let us de…ne
(1 ¡ ®)¼f = a (7)
Now simply plug (5), (7) and (8) in (1) and (2). Our problem can now
be stated as follows:
Max
T2[0;+1[
f (T ) =
a+ ®X(±"¡1d(T ) + 1)
" + ®±d(T )
(9)
over the set of T such that
±f(T )d(T ) +X ¡ ±"¡1Xd(T ) ¸ ¼f (10)
Let us now study the value function f(T ). It easy to show that the
following proposition is veri…ed (see Appendix II).
Proposition 1 for X < ¼f , that is always true by hypothesis, we have that:
f (T )0 < 08T and so the function f(T ) is strictly decreasing in T
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Let us now study the constraint (10). To this end let us de…ne,
h(T ) = ±f (T )d(T ) +X ¡ ±"¡1Xd(T ) (11)
One can show that the following Proposition is true (see Appendix III),
Proposition 2 for X < ¼f we have that:
h(T )0 > 0 8T and so the function h(T ) is strictly increasing in T
So far we have shown that h(T )0 > 0 8T and so that the function h(T )
is strictly increasing. Now, since the function h(T ) is strictly increasing in
T and is unbounded then it will exist a unique T ¤ such that h(T ) = ¼f .
Moreover, since again the function h(T ) is strictly increasing, it will be:
h(T ) ¸ ¼f if and only if T ¸ T ¤.
Therefore the set of T such that the constraint (10) is satis…ed is the
interval [T ¤;+1[.
Recall now that we already shown in Proposition 1 that the value function
f (T ) is strictly decreasing in its argument so that the maximum of this
function over the interval [T ¤;+1[ will be exactly T ¤.
2.4 Discussion of the Equilibrium
There are now two important observations regarding the equilibrium we
found so far. First, on the equilibrium path the capitalists never try to
cheat the workers since the gains generated by the application of the “un-
fair” sharing rule are exactly compensated by the future costs associated with
such an action, that is the reduction in production due to the strike. Second,
despite the fact that workers know that low wages re‡ect demand conditions
rather than cheating attempts by employers, it is rational for them to par-
ticipate in strikes. Why do we get such a paradoxical result? The answer is
that the workers perfectly understand the incentive properties of the equilib-
rium; if they would not go to strike in response to low wages the “incentive
constraint” (3) would not hold the rest of the time, so “fair” behavior would
cease to be optimal for the capitalists. In a sense, the strikes implemented by
the workers are a form of “insurance” against the potential cheating behavior
of the capitalists: the fact that workers actually strike each time they receive
low wages oblige the employers try to avoid, whenever it is possible, this
event. In this light we can say that in explaining the occurrence of strikes an
important role is played by the fact that unions try to maintain some form
of “reputation for toughness” like in the Hick’s analysis.
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2.5 Comparative Statics Exercises
Now let us study how changes in some of the parameters of our model (namely
changes in the values of X and ®) will a¤ect the duration of the cyclical
strike period T ¤. The basic idea here is to test if our model …t some of
the regularities presented in the empirical literatures on strikes and unions
behavior.
2.5.1 Changes in the outside-option’s value
The idea here is to study how the duration of strikes is a¤ected by changes in
the environment. There is some empirical evidence on the fact that reduction
in the costs of strikes for both parties leads to an increase in strike duration5.
Kennan (1980), for example, uses data on the strike duration in US for the
period 1955-1980 provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and …nds out
that the probability of settling a strike over a given period of time depends
on the total cost of strike to both parties over that period. For example he
…nds that Unemployment Insurance payments to strikers will tend to prolong
strikes if these payments constitute a net subsidy to the …rm and its workers.
In the present section we are interested in studying the response of the
equilibrium length of strike to an exogenous reduction of the monetary losses
related to strikes (in terms of our model we are going to study how an increase
of the parameter X a¤ects the value of T ¤). We will see how this simple
exercise of comparative statics will lead us to the same conclusions reached
by the empirical analysis for a su¢ciently big range of the parameters values.
To develope this exercise we have now to study the behavior of the func-
tion T ¤ = T (X), in particular we are interested in studying the sign of the
derivative @@XT (X). To do this let us start considering the function h(X; T )
instead of the function h(T ). From the previous analysis we know that:
8X : h(X;T (X)) = ¼f
and therefore, the function
X ! h(X; T (X))
5From a theoretical point of view Reder and Neumann (1980) and Kennan (1980a) have
proposed the theory that strike activity is inversely related to its cost. In their analysis
what matters is the sum of the costs to both parties, since costs which are incurred by one
side can be shifted to the other side by making a more generous bargaining proposal..
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is constant of constant value ¼.So,
d
dX
h(X; T (X)) = 0 8X
that is,
8X : @
@X
h(X; T (X)) ¢ @
@X
X +
@
@T
h(X; T (X)) ¢ @
@X
T = 0
=) 8X : @
@X
h(X;T (X)) +
@
@T
h(X;T (X)) ¢ @
@X
T = 0
=) T (X)0 = @
@X
T (X) = ¡
@
@X
h(X; T (X))
@
@T
h(X; T (X))
(12)
but we have already shown that
@
@T
h(X;T (X)) > 0 (13)
so to study the sign of T (X)0 we just need to study the sign of:
@
@X
h(X;T (X)) =
@
@X
(±f(T )d(T ) +X ¡ ±"¡1Xd(T ))
In particular we have that (see Appendix 2),
@
@X
h(X;T (X)) = ±d
®(±"¡1d+ 1)
" + ®±d
¡ ±"¡1d+ 1
We have so to study the following disequation,
±d
®(±"¡1d+ 1)
" + ®±d
¡ "¡1±d+ 1 ¸ 0
This implies since " + ®±d > 0
±d®(±"¡1d+ 1) + (" + ®±d)¡ "¡1±d(" + ®±d) ¸ 0
=) ®"¡1(±d)2 + ±d®+ " + ®±d¡ ±d¡ ®"¡1(±d)2 ¸ 0
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=) 2±d®+ " ¡ ±d ¸ 0
=) 2®+ "
±d
¡ 1 ¸ 0
=) ® ¸ 1
2
¡ "
2±d
moreover it is now worthwhile to note that
1
2±
"
d
=
1
2±
1¡ ±
(1¡ ±T ) =
1¡ ±
2± ¡ 2±T+1 =
1
2T
for ± ! 1
infect
lim
±!1
1 ¡ ±
2± ¡ 2±T+1 =by l’Hopitallim±!1
¡1
2 ¡ 2(T + 1)±T =
1
2T
Thus we have that
for ± ! 1 and ® < 1
2
¡ 1
2T
:
@
@X
h(X; T (X)) < 0: (14)
Now by (12), (13) and (14) obviously we get the following,
Proposition 3 for ± ! 1 and ® < 12 ¡ 12T : T (X)0 > 0
2.5.2 Changes in the probability of shock realization
In this section we are going to study how variation in the probability of
shock realization a¤ects the duration of strikes. Empirical studies found
out that there are statistically signi…cant countercyclical variations in the
duration of strikes. A very early peace of evidence on this can be found
in Bevan (1880). During the boom years 1872 and 1873 the duration of
average strike was 20 days in 1872 and 21 days in 1873; a severe recession
occurred in 1879 and in this year the average strike duration was 27 days.
More recently Kennan (1985) and Tracy (1984) found results that con…rm
the countercyclical behavior of the duration of the strikes.
In our model the parameter ® should be interpreted as an idiosyncratic
shock which a¤ect the …rm. An high ® means infect that we are in recession
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(i.e. there is an high probability that a negative shock a¤ects the …rm)
while a low probability of shock means that we are in an expansion ( i.e.
there is a low probability that a negative shock a¤ects the …rm). What we
have to do is therefore to study how an increase in this parameter a¤ects
the duration of the strike. This simple comparative statics exercise will show
how the prediction of our model are again perfectly in line with the empirical
…ndings.
The next step is therefore to study the behavior of the function T ¤ =
T (®), in particular we are interested in studying the sign of the derivative
@
@®
T (®). To do this let us start considering the function h(®; T (®)) instead
of the function h(T ). Using the same reasoning used in the previous section
(see Appendix IV for the details) one can show that,
Proposition 4 The function T (®) is strictly increasing in ® infect: T (®)0 >
0 8®
3 An extension: Human Capital Accumula-
tion
Now we let the agents invest in human capital. The idea is that the level of
human capital accumulated by each one of the party during the cooperation
phase will a¤ect the sharing rule chosen at the end of the following strike
period (that is the division rule seen as fair in the society can change over
the time and it depends on the relative amount of human capital owned by the
two parties). One can think in the investment in graduate education did by
the managers (like an MBA) and in the courses that increase the skills of the
workers. We assume that both C and W when take the decision about how
much to invest in education just consider the e¤ect that the accumulation of
human capital will have on the new sharing rule and that the total revenue
does not depend on the level of human capital achieved6.
We will show that the equilibrium is characterized by a perfect sym-
metry in investment decisions. Therefore, since the parties have rational
expectations, they know that on the equilibrium path it will always be
¼C;t = ¼W;t =
1
2 ¤ TRt: The consequence of this result is that the intro-
6It seems natural to extend the present analysis to the case in which the human capital
accumulation has e¤ects on the total revenues of the future periods.
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duction of this “investment stage” will not a¤ect the strike decisions and so
the cyclical equilibrium we previously found will remain una¤ected.
To model this problem we also assume the parties choose how much to
invest in Human Capital (HC) in each moment of the “cooperation phase”
at the beginning of this phase. In turns, after the conclusion of a strike and
the settlement of a new contract the parties have to choose how much to
invest in education, this decision will last till the next cooperation phase and
will a¤ect all the periods of the present phase.
The resource constraint of each party when they take the HC investment
decision is:
HCi;t + ci;t  ¼i;t i = C;W
Moreover we consider Risk Neutral agents, so that the intertemporal util-
ity function can be express as follows,
Ui =
1X
t=0
±tu(ci;t)dt
where,
u(ci;t) = ci;t
And we consider that the sharing rule applied after each strike period (we
call this function the Con‡ict Technology) is the following
¼i;t =
f (HC i;t)
f(HC i;t) + f (HC¡i;t)
TRt
where HC i;t is the total human capital accumulated by the party i in the
previous cooperation phase, that is the sum of human capital accumulate
in each period of the cooperation phase. Calling K the generic length of a
cooperation phase then HC i;t can be express as follows,
HC i;t =
KX
k=0
HCi;t¡T¡k = K ¢ (HCi;t¡T¡K)
Infect the amount of money invested in human capital in each period
of the cooperation phase is constant, that is HCi;t¡T¡k = HCi;t¡T¡K 8k 2
[0; K]. So we have
¼i;t =
f(K ¢HCi;t¡T¡K)
f (K ¢HCi;t¡T¡K) + f (K ¢HC¡i;t¡T¡K)TRt
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and the function f(¢) is a concave and increasing function. In particular let
us consider the following case:
¼i;t =
(K ¢HCi;t¡T¡K)¯
(K ¢HCi;t¡T¡K)¯ + (K ¢HC¡i;t¡T¡K)¯ TRt
therefore,
¼i;t =
K¯(HC¯i;t¡T¡K)
K¯(HC¯i;t¡T¡K) +K¯(HC
¯
¡i;t¡T¡K)
TRt
and then,
¼i;t =
(HC¯i;t¡T¡K)
(HC¯i;t¡T¡K) + (HC
¯
¡i;t¡T¡K)
TRt
Note that the expected length of a cooperation period is:
®¢1+2¢(1¡®)¢®+3¢(1¡®)2¢®+4¢(1¡®)3¢®::: = ®
1X
k=0
(1¡®)k(k+1) = ®
1X
k=1
k(1¡®)k¡1
It is straightforward to show that this series is convergent and let us call
the value of this series ª®.
Since the individuals are risk neutral when they discount they consider
as a data this expectation. Moreover the agents are aware that the length of
the strike phase is T ¤.
In the light of what we said the problem that each agent will face at the
beginning of each cooperation phase is the following:
Max
HCi;t;ci;t
1X
k=0
±k(1¡®)k [ci;t]+
1X
j=0
±ª®+T
¤+j(1¡®)j
"
HC¯i;t
HC¯i;t +HC
¯
¡i;t
Et(TRt+ª®+T )
#
s:t:ci;t = ¼i;t ¡HCi;t
But since we have assumed that the total revenue is una¤ected by the
human capital investment decisions, this means that when the parties maxi-
mize they consider the total revenue of the next cooperation phase as given
and in particular their expectation is Et(TRt+ª®+T ) = TRt. Moreover the
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agents are Risk Neutral, therefore we can express the maximization problem
as follows:
Max
HCi;t
P1
k=0 ±
k(1¡ ®)k [¼i;t ¡HCi;t]
Expected costs of HC investment
+
P1
j=0 ±
ª®+T ¤+j(1 ¡ ®)j

HC
¯
i;t
HC
¯
i;t+HC
¯
¡i;t
TRt
¸
Expected gains of HC investment
This maximization problem has a very straightforward interpretation:
the agents, both workers and capitalists, try to maximize the sum of the
discounted gains derived from human capital investment (given by its e¤ect
on the new contract) and of its costs (given by the amount of money spent
in education).
The maximization problem can be rewritten as follows:
Max
HCi;t
1X
k=0
(
±k(1 ¡ ®)k [¼i;t ¡HCi;t] + ±ª®+T ¤+k(1¡ ®)k
"
HC¯i;t
HC¯i;t +HC
¯
¡i;t
TRt
#)
And thus,
Max
HCi;t
1X
k=0
(1¡ ®)k ¢ ±k ¢
"
¼i;t ¡HCi;t + ±ª®+T ¤
HC¯i;t
HC¯i;t +HC
¯
¡i;t
TRt
#
The FOC for this problem is @F
@HCi;t
= 0. Therefore, recalling that in this
problem ¼i;t is given when the agents take the decision and so we can treat
it as a constant, we get the following condition:
1X
k=0
(1¡®)k¢±k¢
264¡1 + ±ª®+T ¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡1i;t ¢ (HC¯i;t +HC¯¡i;t)¡ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡1i;t ¢HC¯i;t³
HC¯i;t +HC
¯
¡i;t
´2
375
This condition implicitly de…nes the Best Reply functions for both parties:
the equilibrium is given by the intersections of these functions. In particular,
it is easy to show that the Nash equilibrium for this game is symmetric.
Moreover the equilibrium level of investment in human capital for the two
players is positively related with the total revenue, the parameter ¯ and the
intertemporal discount factor and negatively related, since ± < 1, with the
strike length and the expected length of a cooperation phase (i.e. the more
distant in time they will be the advantages derived by the investment the
less parties will invest). This equilibrium level is (see Appendix V for the
derivation):
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HC¤i;t =
1
4
¢ ±ª®+T ¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯ (15)
There are now some important observations to do regarding this result.
First, equation (15) states that the amount of money that the parties choose
to invest in human capital in equilibrium is related with the total revenue
of the current period; this means that, ceteris paribus, in a richer economy
(with larger demand and higher revenue) there will be more investment in
human capital than in a poor country. This theoretical result is perfectly in
line with recent theoretical and empirical works on human capital (see, e.g.
Lucas (1988), Romer (1990) and Ciccone and Peri (2000)).
Second, in equilibrium the investment in human capital is, of course,
linearly related with the e¤ectiveness of the Con‡ict Technology. This means
that, ceteris paribus, a country in which the contracts are more “sensible”
with respect to the skills of the individuals should be characterized by higher
levels of human capital investments with respect to a country in which the
contracts are related with other variables. This result is perfectly in line with
the theoretical analysis of Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1999).
Finally, note that in our framework the “engine” of the investment in
human capital is the existence of a repeated bargaining over the contracts.
The veri…cation of the strikes is a precondition for this continuous bargaining
and therefore one direct implication of this result is that strikes and Trade
Unions play an important role in explaining the accumulation of this kind of
capital good in the modern economies.
4 Conclusions
In this paper a simple two-players repeated game theoretic model is devel-
oped. It allows to analyze the interaction between workers and employers
and the occurrence of cyclical periods of strikes. The main result is that we
provide a theory of strikes consistent with some important empirical …ndings;
this theory is based on the assumption of asymmetric information between
the parties on the conditions of the market. Workers use strikes as a form
of insurance against the potential cheating of the employers: the fact that
workers actually strike each time they receive low wages oblige the employers
try to avoid, whenever it is possible, this event. As a consequence employers
reduce wages just in case of negative demand shock and only in this case
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strikes happen.
We also provide an extension allowing the parties to invest in human cap-
ital. The incentive for this kind of investment is given by an hypothesis on
the bargaining power of the parties. We assume the bargaining power as a
function of the human capital accumulated by each party. This assumption
is meant to capture the fact that relative more skilled individuals are usually
able to obtain better contracts in the bargaining phase. The basic result is
that, once allowed to take this kind of decisions, both workers and employ-
ers invest in human capital an amount of money proportional to the total
revenues and to the e¤ectiveness of the con‡ict technology. This result put
in a new light the role that strikes and Trade Unions play in the process of
development of a modern economy, infect they are in a sense the cause of
human capital investment.
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that in the present paper is not developed
a complete growth model. This choice was made to better evidence the
reasons that lead to the strikes and the key role of repeated bargaining over
the contracts to explain the human capital investment decisions. I guess
that developing a growth model on the basis of the present model could give
rise to an equilibrium characterized by growth cycles starting when negative
shocks a¤ect the economy and lasting till the end of the consequent strike.
In this case the source of growth would be the human capital accumulation
while the source of the cycles would be the negative shocks.
5 Appendixes
5.1 Comparison of Value Functions
We have to show that V + > V ¡. By (2) and (5) we know that we can express
these value functions as follows:
V + =
(1¡ ®)¼f + ®(±X +X)
1¡ (1 ¡ ®)± ¡ ®±T+1
V ¡ =
(1¡ ®)¼f±T + ®(±X +X)±T
1 ¡ (1¡ ®)± ¡ ®±T+1 +X
Therefore we remain to prove that the following disequation is always
veri…ed,
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(1 ¡ ±T ) ¢ (1 ¡ ®)¼
f + ®(±X +X)
1 ¡ (1¡ ®)± ¡ ®±T+1 > X
Using (6), (7) and (8) we can rewrite this expression as follows,
d ¢ a + ®x(±"
¡1d+ 1)
"+ ®±d
> "¡1xd
And rearranging terms we easily get
(1 ¡ ®)x + ®±d(1 ¡ "¡1)x 6 (1¡ ®)¼f
Note now that
"¡1 =
1
1 ¡ ± > 1) (1 ¡ "
¡1) < 0 ) ®±d(1 ¡ "¡1)x < 0
Thus
(1 ¡ ®)x+ ®±d(1 ¡ "¡1)x 6 (1¡ ®)x
And since ¼f > x by assumption we have that
(1 ¡ ®)x + ®±d(1 ¡ "¡1)x 6 (1 ¡ ®)x < (1 ¡ ®)¼f
That means V + > V ¡.
5.2 Proof of proposition 1
To study the value function f(T ) we have to consider its …rst derivative,
d
dT
f(T ) = f(T )0 =
®X±"¡1d0(" + ®±d)¡ ®±d0(a+ ®X(±"¡1d + 1))
(" + ®±d)2
(*)
Since (" + ®±d)2 > 0, to study the sign of this …rst derivative is enough
to study the sign of its numerator. So we have to study the sign of
®X±"¡1d0(" + ®±d)¡ ®±d0(a+ ®X(±"¡1d + 1)) =
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= ®X±"¡1d0" + (®X±"¡1d0)(®±d)¡ a®±d0 ¡ ®2±d0X ¡ (®±d)(®X±"¡1d0) =
= X®±d0(1 ¡ ®)¡ a®±d0
Therefore:
f(T )0 < 0 if and only if X(1 ¡ ®)¡ a < 0
that is:
f (T )0 < 0 if and only if X(1 ¡ ®)¡ (1¡ ®)¼f < 0 (**)
but this conditions means X < ¼f that is always true by hypothesis.
5.3 Proof of proposition 2
We have to study the following function,
h(T ) = ±f (T )d(T ) +X ¡ ±"¡1Xd(T )
In particular we want to analyze how this function varies when T varies;
so let us consider its …rst derivative
d
dT
h(T ) = h(T )0 = ±(f 0 ¢ d+ d0 ¢ f )¡ ±"¡1Xd0
so
1
±
h(T )0 = f 0 ¢ d+ d0 ¢ f ¡ "¡1Xd0
thus by (*) we get
1
±
h(T )0 =
®X±"¡1d0(" + ®±d)¡ ®±d0(a + ®X(±"¡1d+ 1))
("+ ®±d)2
¢d+d0 ¢f¡"¡1Xd0
1
±
h(T )0 = d0 ¢

f ¡ "¡1X + ®X±"
¡1(" + ®±d)¡ ®±(a + ®X(±"¡1d+ 1))
("+ ®±d)2
¢ d
¸
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1±
h(T )0 = d0¢

f ¡ "¡1X + ®±"
¡1X" + (®±)2"¡1Xd ¡ a®± ¡ (®±)2"¡1Xd ¡ ®2X±
("+ ®±d)2
¢ d
¸
and by (9)
1
±
h(T )0 = d0 ¢

a + ®X(±"¡1d+ 1)
" + ®±d
¡ "¡1X + ®±"
¡1X" ¡ a®± ¡ ®2X±
(" + ®±d)2
¢ d
¸
1
±
h(T )0 = d0¢

(a + ®X(±"¡1d+ 1))(" + ®±d)
("+ ®±d)2
¡ "¡1X + ®±"
¡1X"¡ a®± ¡ ®2X±
(" + ®±d)2
¢ d
¸
that is
1
±
h(T )0 = d0¢

(a + ®X±"¡1d+ ®X)(" + ®±d)
(" + ®±d)2
¡ "
¡1X(" + ®±d)2
(" + ®±d)2
+
®±"¡1X" ¡ a®± ¡ ®2X±
("+ ®±d)2
We have to study whether or not h(T )0 > 0 so, since ("+ ®±d)2 > 0 and
d0 > 0, we have to analyze the simply the following disequation
(a+®X±"¡1d+®X)("+®±d)¡"¡1X("+®±d)2+(®±"¡1X"¡a®±¡®2X±)d ¸ 0
so,
a"+®X±"¡1d"+®X"+a®±d+(®±d)2X"¡1+®2X±d+®X±"¡1d"¡a®±d¡
®2dX± ¡ "¡1X"2 ¡ "¡1X(®±d)2¡
¡2"¡1X"®±d ¸ 0, a"+®X"¡ "¡1X"2 ¸ 0,(since " > 0), a+®X¡
"¡1X" ¸ 0
Thus, for h(T )0 be positive it should be:
(1¡ ®)¼f + ®X ¡X ¸ 0
Therefore,
h(T )0 > 0 if and only if (1 ¡ ®)¼f ¡ (1 ¡ ®)X > 0
but this conditions means ¼f > X that is always true by hypothesis.
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5.4 Proof of proposition 4
We are interested in studying the sign of the derivative @
@®
T (®). To do this
let us start considering the function h(®;T (®)) instead of the function h(T ).
We know that:
8® : h(®; T (®)) = ¼f
and therefore, the function
® ! h(®; T (®))
is constant of constant value ¼f .So,
d
d®
h(®; T (®)) = 0 8®
that is,
8® : @
@®
h(®; T (®)) ¢ @
@®
®+
@
@T
h(®; T (®)) ¢ @
@®
T = 0
=) 8® : @
@®
h(®; T (®)) +
@
@T
h(®;T (®)) ¢ @
@®
T = 0
=) T (®)0 = @
@®
T (®) = ¡
@
@®h(®; T (®))
@
@T
h(®; T (®))
(i)
recall that studying the e¤ects of changes in X we have already shown
that
@
@T
h(®;T (®)) > 0 (ii)
so to study the sign of T (®)0 we just need to study the sign of:
@
@®
h(®;T (®)) =
@
@®
(±f (T )d(T ) +X ¡ ±"¡1Xd(T )) =
= ±d
@
@®
f (T )
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And by (9),
@
@®
h(®;T (®)) = ±d
@
@®
a+ ®X(±"¡1d+ 1)
" + ®±d
= ±d
@
@®
(1 ¡ ®)¼f + ®X(±"¡1d+ 1)
" + ®±d
that is
@
@®
h(®;T (®)) = ±d
[X(±"¡1d+ 1)¡ ¼f ]("+ ®±d)¡ ±d[(1 ¡ ®)¼f + ®X(±"¡1d+ 1)]
(" + ®±d)2
Now, since ±d("+®±d)2 > 0, to study the sign of
@
@®
h(®; T (®)) we have to
study the sign of the numerator of the previous expression. That is
"X(±"¡1d+1)¡¼f"+®X±d(±"¡1d+1)¡¼f®±d¡±d(1¡®)¼f¡±d®X(±"¡1d+1) ¸ 0
=) "X(±"¡1d+ 1)¡ ¼f" ¡ ¼f±d ¸ 0
=) "X±qd + "X ¡ ¼f" ¡ ¼f±d ¸ 0
=) "(X ¡ ¼f ) + ±d("¡1"X ¡ ¼f ) ¸ 0
so we have
(" + ±d)(X ¡ ¼f ) ¸ 0
Now, since " + ±d > 0 and since X < ¼ by assumption, we get that
@
@®
h(®;T (®)) < 0 8® (iii)
An …nally by (i), (ii) and (iii)
T (®)0 > 0
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5.5 Human Capital investment equilibrium strategies
We know that the FOC for the problem of the two parties leads to the
following condition:
1X
k=0
(1¡®)k
264¡1 + ±ª®+T ¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡1i;t ¢ (HC¯i;t +HC¯¡i;t) ¡ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡1i;t ¢HC¯i;t³
HC¯i;t +HC
¯
¡i;t
´2
375 =
that is,
¡1+±ª®+T ¤ ¢TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC
¯¡1
i;t ¢ (HC¯i;t +HC¯¡i;t)¡ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡1i;t ¢HC¯i;t³
HC¯i;t +HC
¯
¡i;t
´2 = 0
to …nd the equilibrium we have thus to solve the following system of
two equations in two unknowns given by the best reply functions of the two
parties:
BR1(HC2;t) : ¡1+±ª®+T¤ ¢
TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡11;t ¢ (HC¯1;t +HC¯2;t)¡ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡11;t ¢HC¯1;t³
HC¯1;t +HC
¯
2;t
´2 = 0
(a)
BR2(HC1;t) : ¡1+±ª®+T¤ ¢
TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡12;t ¢ (HC¯1;t +HC¯2;t)¡ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡12;t ¢HC¯2;t³
HC¯1;t +HC
¯
2;t
´2 = 0
(b)
So we have to solve:
¡1 + ±ª®+T ¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC
¯¡1
1;t ¢ (HC¯1;t +HC¯2;t)¡ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC2¯¡11;t³
HC¯1;t +HC
¯
2;t
´2 = 0
¡1 + ±ª®+T ¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC
¯¡1
2;t ¢ (HC¯1;t +HC¯2;t) ¡ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC2¯¡12;t³
HC¯1;t +HC
¯
2;t
´2 = 0
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By (a) rearranged we get:
HC2¯1;t +HC
2¯
2;t+2HC
¯
1;tHC
¯
2;t = ±
ª®+T ¤ ¢TRt¢¯ ¢(HC2¯¡12;t +HC¯¡12;t HC¯1;t¡HC2¯¡12;t )
) HC2¯1;t +HC2¯2;t + 2HC¯1;tHC¯2;t = ±ª®+T
¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡12;t HC¯1;t (a1)
Equivalently by (b) rearranged we get:
HC2¯1;t +HC
2¯
2;t + 2HC
¯
1;tHC
¯
2;t = ±
ª®+T ¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡11;t HC¯2;t (b1)
Therefore by (a1) and (a2) since they have the same LHS:
TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡12;t HC¯1;t = TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC¯¡11;t HC¯2;t
) HC¯¡12;t ¢HC¯1;t = HC¯¡11;t ¢HC¯2;t
and dividing both sides by HC¯1;t ¢HC¯2;t we end with,
) HC¡12;t = HC¡11;t ) HC1;t = HC2;t
Substituting this value in (a1) we have,
HC2¯1;t +HC
2¯
1;t + 2HC
2¯
1;t = ±
ª®+T ¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯ ¢HC2¯¡11;t
) HC1;t = 1
4
¢ ±ª®+T ¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯ = HC2;t
that is,
HC¤i;t = HC
¤
¡i;t =
1
4
¢ ±ª®+T ¤ ¢ TRt ¢ ¯
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